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China: Criminal Liability of Controlling Shareholders and Senior Management in Listed Companies
18/11/2026China’s securities regulators are increasingly pursuing criminal accountability against the individuals responsible for misconduct within listed companies. Enforcement is no longer confined to administrative penalties against companies themselves. Controlling shareholders, actual controllers, directors and senior executives face growing scrutiny over their personal involvement in financial misconduct, unlawful guarantees and failures to disclose material information.
According to the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), enforcement activity in 2025 included 32 cases involving the misuse of controlling positions to appropriate or occupy more than RMB 100 million in listed-company funds. The regulator also referred 172 suspected securities and futures criminal cases to public security authorities, involving more than 500 parties.
In April 2026, the CSRC reinforced this approach through its annual financial fraud enforcement programme, emphasising the referral of suspected fraudulent securities issuance, unlawful information disclosure, breaches of trust and conduct damaging the interests of listed companies for criminal investigation.
Three areas have emerged as particularly significant: the misappropriation or occupation of company funds, unlawful guarantees and failures to disclose material information. These cases increasingly focus on China’s so-called key minority — the individuals who exercise real control over corporate decisions.
1. Criminal Offences and Judicial Trends
Misappropriation of Funds and Unlawful Guarantees
Three principal categories of criminal offences may arise where listed-company funds are improperly used or guarantees are provided without appropriate authorisation.
Breach of trust causing harm to the interests of a listed company
This offence covers conduct such as providing company funds without consideration, entering into transactions on manifestly unfair terms or providing guarantees to parties clearly unable to meet their financial obligations.
A case announced by the Ministry of Public Security in 2025 illustrates how these provisions are applied.
Chen Mourong, chairman of Group A, instructed executives of a listed company to transfer more than RMB 2.3 billion to Group A through related-party accounts. He also arranged guarantees exceeding RMB 1.1 billion in the listed company’s name without board approval or the required disclosures.
More than RMB 2 billion remained outstanding when the matter was investigated.
In July 2024, the Wenzhou Intermediate People’s Court found Chen and other defendants guilty of offences involving breach of trust causing harm to a listed company and unlawful disclosure or non-disclosure of important information.
The case demonstrates that transactions involving controlling shareholders and related entities may attract criminal liability when corporate assets are diverted or exposed to risks without proper authorisation.
Misappropriation of funds and occupational embezzlement
Where funds are transferred to an actual controller or an entity under that person’s control, investigating authorities may also consider offences involving misappropriation of funds or occupational embezzlement.
The distinction between these offences and breach of trust can depend on the intended use of the funds, the circumstances of the transfer and whether there is evidence of personal use or an intention to unlawfully appropriate the assets.
The involvement of a group company or related entity does not, by itself, prevent criminal liability.
Unlawful disclosure or failure to disclose important information
A further offence, sometimes underestimated in practice, concerns the unlawful disclosure or concealment of material information.
Even where the evidence does not establish all the elements of breach of trust, a failure to disclose material fund occupation or guarantees may constitute a separate criminal offence if the applicable statutory conditions are satisfied.
Unlike certain breach-of-trust offences, prosecution for unlawful information disclosure does not necessarily require proof that the listed company suffered an actual financial loss.
This makes disclosure-related offences particularly important in criminal investigations involving complex related-party transactions.
In the Kangmei Pharmaceutical case, publicised jointly by the Supreme People’s Court and other authorities in 2022, Ma Xingtian arranged undisclosed non-operating fund transfers involving the controlling shareholder and related parties totalling approximately RMB 11.619 billion. He received a combined sentence of 12 years’ imprisonment and a fine of RMB 1.2 million for multiple offences.
Similarly, in the Chengdu Deng case ((2022) Chuan 01 Xing Chu No. 27), an actual controller occupied more than RMB 2 billion of company funds through fabricated contracts and accounting arrangements without the required disclosures. Criminal liability arose from the failure to disclose important information.
These cases demonstrate that the concealment of financial transactions can create significant criminal exposure independently of the underlying misuse of funds.
2. Criminal Liability for Information Disclosure Violations
Information disclosure misconduct primarily involves two offences under China’s Criminal Law:
Fraudulent issuance of securities under Article 160.
Unlawful disclosure or failure to disclose important information under Article 161.
Following Criminal Law Amendment XI, the maximum sentence for particularly serious offences involving unlawful disclosure or failure to disclose important information increased to ten years’ imprisonment.
Both provisions expressly address the responsibilities of controlling shareholders and actual controllers, although the scope of liability differs.
Article 160 addresses controlling shareholders and actual controllers who organise or direct fraudulent securities issuance.
Article 161 extends further. In addition to implementing, organising or directing unlawful disclosure, it addresses circumstances where controlling shareholders or actual controllers conceal relevant matters and thereby cause the company to make unlawful disclosures.
This distinction is important because liability may extend beyond the individuals who formally prepare or sign disclosure documents.
A person who deliberately withholds material information from the company may face criminal responsibility even without personally making the resulting disclosure.
3. Emerging Judicial Trends
Recent cases reveal several important patterns in how Chinese courts assess criminal responsibility.
Greater penalties for organisers and decision-makers
Courts increasingly distinguish between individuals who organise, direct or instigate misconduct and those whose involvement is limited to implementation.
Organisers and principal decision-makers may face substantial custodial sentences, particularly where multiple serious offences are involved.
By contrast, defendants with more limited involvement, or those who surrender voluntarily, return unlawfully obtained funds or make meaningful restitution, may receive more lenient treatment where the law permits.
The severity of punishment does not depend solely on the scale of financial misstatements. A defendant’s actual role, decision-making authority, involvement in multiple offences and subsequent conduct can be decisive.
Multiple offences and combined sentencing
Where conduct constitutes several distinct crimes, Chinese courts may impose combined sentences rather than treating the misconduct as a single offence.
Cases involving fraudulent issuance, unlawful disclosure, breach of trust and securities market manipulation illustrate the importance of assessing each offence independently.
For defence lawyers, this places particular emphasis on examining the evidential basis for each charge, identifying the defendant’s actual responsibilities and challenging weaknesses in the prosecution’s evidence.
Substance over formal position
Perhaps the most significant trend is the increasing emphasis on actual control rather than formal corporate titles.
Resignation, nominee shareholding arrangements or the absence of an official management appointment do not necessarily shield an individual from criminal liability.
The Zhao Weiguo case, publicised by the Supreme People’s Court in May 2025, illustrates this approach.
Although Zhao did not hold a formal director, supervisor or senior management position within the listed company, he exercised actual control and instructed directors to lease company projects to related parties at prices substantially below market value.
The arrangements caused economic losses exceeding RMB 46.45 million.
The court imposed a three-year custodial sentence and an RMB 2 million fine for breach of trust causing harm to the listed company, alongside penalties for other offences.
The case demonstrates that individuals exercising control from outside a company’s formal management structure can still be held criminally accountable.
Where control is exercised through family members, nominee arrangements or corporate entities, investigators may examine the underlying beneficial relationships and actual decision-making authority.
4. Personal Liability in Corporate Criminal Offences
Responsibility of individuals within a company
Article 31 of China’s Criminal Law establishes a dual-penalty framework for corporate offences.
Where a corporate entity commits a criminal offence, the entity may be fined, while criminal liability may also extend to:
Directly responsible persons in charge.
Other directly responsible personnel.
The central question is therefore not simply an individual’s title but their actual involvement in the relevant conduct.
Judicial guidance has distinguished those who decide, approve, instruct, permit or direct unlawful activity from individuals who implement decisions or perform subordinate functions.
An employee who merely follows instructions, without significant responsibility for the offence, should not automatically be treated in the same manner as the person directing the misconduct.
The Supreme People’s Procuratorate’s August 2024 guidance on financial fraud offences further emphasises factors including actual control, decision-making authority, management responsibilities and knowledge of false disclosures.
A case illustrating differences in responsibility
In a case before the Beijing No. 3 Intermediate People’s Court ((2023) Jing 03 Xing Chu No. 16), two individuals held comparable positions as actual controllers of a company.
One, Zhang Mouwen, also served as chairman and general manager. He personally decided not to disclose litigation-related information involving more than RMB 180 million and was held criminally responsible.
The other actual controller, who served as vice chairman and deputy general manager, did not lead or make the relevant concealment decision and was subject to administrative penalties rather than criminal prosecution.
Their formal positions were similar, but their legal outcomes differed substantially.
The decisive distinction was their actual participation in the decision to withhold information.
5. When Formal Titles and Actual Authority Do Not Align
In corporate practice, formal responsibility and actual decision-making power do not always rest with the same individual.
A person signing a disclosure document may not have made the underlying decision. Conversely, an actual controller may direct corporate conduct without formally holding office.
Chinese criminal law increasingly addresses both situations.
Individuals exercising control without formal appointments
Article 169-1 of the Criminal Law expressly addresses controlling shareholders and actual controllers who instruct conduct constituting breach of trust harmful to a listed company.
This allows criminal responsibility to reach individuals directing misconduct from outside the company’s formal management structure.
A similar approach applies to information disclosure.
In the Jiuhao Group case, publicised by four authorities in 2022, false information originated from a non-listed company involved in a proposed backdoor listing, although the formal disclosure obligations concerned the listed company.
The authorities recognised that information disclosure responsibilities may extend to parties involved in acquisitions, major asset restructurings, refinancing and other significant transactions.
Guo Moujun, the actual controller of Jiuhao Group, was sentenced to two years and three months’ imprisonment.
The case illustrates how liability can follow actual control over information and transactions rather than being confined to the nominal disclosure entity.
However, statutory distinctions remain important. Criminal Law Amendment XII expanded certain offences involving unlawful operation of competing businesses to directors, supervisors and senior executives of private enterprises, without introducing equivalent express provisions for directing such offences. The liability of an actual controller in those circumstances must therefore be assessed under the applicable rules governing joint criminal offences.
Individuals holding formal responsibility without actual control
The absence of ultimate decision-making authority does not automatically exempt an individual who signs or approves unlawful disclosures.
The August 2024 guidance on financial fraud offences highlights the importance of whether a person knew that information was false and whether they fulfilled the responsibilities attached to their position.
Signing or confirming a false disclosure document within an individual’s area of responsibility may provide significant evidence of knowledge.
A claim that the individual was merely following instructions may not be sufficient, particularly where they continued to sign documents despite objections or failed to take appropriate steps to raise their concerns.
Written objections, refusal to approve inaccurate documents and appropriate reporting or escalation may therefore become important evidence when assessing individual responsibility.
6. Evidence and Key Issues in Criminal Proceedings
Three issues frequently determine the outcome of criminal proceedings involving listed-company misconduct.
Establishing knowledge and intent
For controlling shareholders and actual controllers who operate behind the scenes, investigators commonly rely on several categories of evidence to establish whether misconduct was deliberately organised or directed.
These include:
Testimony from employees who received or implemented instructions.
Board records, approval documents, correspondence and electronic communications demonstrating decision-making processes.
Financial records tracing the movement of funds and identifying the ultimate recipients or beneficiaries.
Taken together, these materials may establish an individual’s actual role even where there is no formal written instruction to commit an offence.
For directors, supervisors and senior management who sign disclosure documents, the assessment of knowledge also takes account of their responsibilities and involvement in preparing or approving the information.
Determining financial amounts and losses
The calculation of relevant financial amounts is another significant issue.
In information disclosure cases, materiality and applicable prosecution thresholds must be assessed according to the relevant legal standards and calculation rules.
In breach-of-trust cases, direct economic losses are particularly important.
Judicial practice may consider the amount of company funds remaining unreturned when criminal proceedings are initiated. For unlawful guarantees, the relevant loss may be based on amounts actually paid or recovered under the guarantee rather than its full nominal value.
Where funds have become mixed with other transactions and company accounts are unclear, forensic accounting evidence may be essential.
If the alleged loss cannot be reliably established, deficiencies in the financial evidence may prevent the prosecution from proving the offence.
Distinguishing criminal misconduct from commercial loss
Not every transaction resulting in financial loss constitutes a criminal offence.
In a case considered by the Beijing No. 3 Intermediate People’s Court ((2020) Jing 03 Xing Chu No. 170), the court examined whether conduct falling within the broader provisions concerning harm to a listed company’s interests should be treated as criminal.
The court considered four principal factors:
Whether the transaction was intended to protect or advance the company’s interests.
Whether the conduct complied with applicable law, the company’s articles of association and internal decision-making procedures.
Whether personal interests or improper transfers of benefits were involved.
Whether there was a legally sufficient causal connection between the conduct and the alleged financial loss.
The case involved company funds used in connection with a genuine property purchase. The eventual loss of a deposit arose from commercial contractual risk.
The court concluded that the circumstances did not establish the offence of breach of trust causing harm to a listed company.
This distinction remains important: criminal liability must be established through the statutory elements of the offence, not merely inferred from an unsuccessful commercial decision.
7. Evidence Obtained During Regulatory Investigations
China’s legal framework permits certain evidence collected through administrative investigations to be used in subsequent criminal proceedings.
Under Article 54, paragraph 2, of the Criminal Procedure Law, evidence including physical and documentary materials, audiovisual recordings and electronic data collected by administrative authorities may be admitted in criminal proceedings in accordance with the law.
This is particularly significant in securities cases, where regulators often conduct extensive investigations before referring matters for criminal prosecution.
The Zhangzidao financial fraud case provides an example.
Following the destruction of original fishing and financial records, the CSRC obtained 27 sets of Beidou satellite navigation and positioning data from fishing vessels.
Specialist analysis reconstructed vessel movements and estimated fishing areas, helping investigators assess the company’s actual activities and the accuracy of its financial disclosures.
Electronic evidence, expert analysis and materials gathered during the administrative investigation subsequently contributed to the criminal proceedings.
The case illustrates how digital and technical evidence can be used to reconstruct transactions and business activities even when original records have been lost or destroyed.
8. Compliance Recommendations for Listed Companies
The growing emphasis on personal criminal liability makes it essential for listed companies to establish clear responsibilities, effective internal controls and reliable documentary records.
Compliance systems should not merely describe corporate responsibilities. They should also provide evidence of who knew about a matter, who authorised a decision and how it was implemented.
Clearly document authority and reporting responsibilities
Companies should establish written procedures defining the responsibilities of actual controllers, chairpersons, general managers, chief financial officers and board secretaries in relation to:
Allocation and transfer of company funds.
Related-party transactions.
External guarantees.
Financial reporting and material information disclosure.
Controlling shareholders and actual controllers should be required to notify the company in writing of material matters affecting disclosure obligations.
Documented reporting and approval procedures can help establish clear boundaries between decision-makers and individuals responsible for implementing instructions.
Maintain comprehensive records of transactions and guarantees
Listed companies should strengthen their ability to identify and reconstruct related-party transactions.
Particular attention should be given to indirect relationships involving nominee shareholders, family members, undisclosed beneficial interests and arrangements such as pledges of certificates of deposit.
Records should capture both the formal parties to a transaction and the individuals or entities exercising actual control.
Major funding decisions, board approvals, guarantee arrangements and supporting documentation should be retained systematically.
Independent verification procedures, including bank confirmations obtained directly by external auditors, can also strengthen the reliability of financial information.
Ensure objections are properly recorded
Directors, supervisors and senior executives who disagree with information contained in periodic reports should formally record their concerns.
Article 82 of the Securities Law provides a framework for written confirmation opinions, including the expression of objections and the reasons for them.
Where necessary, individuals should consider the appropriate statutory procedures for ensuring that concerns are disclosed or escalated.
Simply raising an oral objection while continuing to approve inaccurate information may offer limited protection.
Respond promptly to identified misconduct
Where an audit committee identifies suspected fund occupation or unlawful guarantees, the company should promptly investigate and take appropriate steps to recover funds or release guarantees.
However, the fulfilment of information disclosure obligations should not be delayed while repayment or remediation is pursued.
The CSRC’s April 2026 corporate governance enforcement initiative also placed emphasis on strengthening audit committee oversight and supporting targeted investigations.
Preserve evidence and undertake independent investigations
When potential financial misconduct is identified, companies should take immediate steps to preserve original records, electronic communications, accounting information and other relevant evidence.
Where appropriate, independent external legal advisers should lead or support internal investigations to establish the facts and assess potential regulatory and criminal exposure.
Even where criminal proceedings have commenced, meaningful remediation, restitution and improvements to compliance systems may remain relevant to the assessment of liability and sentencing.
Conclusion
China’s approach to securities-related criminal enforcement increasingly focuses on the individuals who exercise actual control over corporate misconduct.
The distinction between formal authority and practical decision-making has become central to determining criminal responsibility. Controlling shareholders and actual controllers cannot necessarily avoid liability by remaining outside a listed company’s formal management structure, while directors and senior executives must recognise that signing or approving inaccurate disclosures can expose them to personal criminal risk.
For listed companies, the implications extend beyond avoiding particular prohibited transactions.
Effective compliance requires transparent decision-making, clear accountability, reliable reporting, properly documented objections and the preservation of evidence capable of demonstrating how decisions were made.
As regulatory and criminal enforcement become more closely connected, companies and their leadership should treat these safeguards as essential components of corporate governance rather than merely administrative formalities.
Anjie Broad, China, a Transatlantic Law International Affiliated Firm.
For further information or for any assistance please contact china@transatlanticlaw.com
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